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This essay aims at providing a comparative review on the US hegemony between the 
mainstream perspectives and different views provided by the two newly published 
books. The first book (Good-bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System) 
written by Reich and Lebow rejected the widespread view about the lasting American 
hegemonic power in the world during the post-war decades. By reformulating the con-
cepts of power and influence and an elaborating their complex relationship, Reich and 
Lebow elucidate distinct roles played by European Union in agenda setting (advocating 
policies and principles of order), China in custodianship (stabilizing the world econ-
omy) while the US maintains its sponsorship (initiating rules and institutions) in global 
governance.
The second book (The end of American world order) written by Acharya focus more 
on what comes after the US hegemony.  Different from the conventional perspectives 
that often centered on the debates of possible decline of the US hegemony, Acharya con-
cerns more about the decline of the American world order (AWO). He does not assume 
the US is in terminal decline but the waning of AWO is more likely. A more regionalized 
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and pluralist world order will arise though Acharya does not deny that the US will con-
tinue to play a central role in global affairs in the foreseeable future.
Overall, both books consider the US hegemony is not and will not be the only domi-
nant power in the world. A multipolar world is in formation and US will have to cooper-
ate, rather than belittle other emerging powers.
The two books come at the time when the political economy in East Asia and in the 
world is changing. In November 2014, Asia-Pacific economies’ agreement to work 
towards a Chinese-backed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) during the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit is widely considered as giving Beijing a 
bigger role in managing regional economic integration. Up to April 2015, 57 countries, 
including several US traditional allies, were approved as founding members of China-led 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The establishment of AIIB is often regarded 
as a potential competitor to the US-led International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank. Several countries’ rush to be part of AIIB shows that the US-led AWO has already 
lost its attractiveness. The AIIB could probably take that US influence away and affect 
geo-political governance by giving financial loans to countries in need. In response, 
American officials have welcomed the Chinese plan and expressed that FTAAP does not 
conflict with Washington’s preferred Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which excludes 
China.1 As for AIIB, President Obama also stated that the US never opposed AIIB and 
wants to cooperate with it.2
Although the reconstitution of the world order in the future is still uncertain, the 
world seems shifting towards what Reich and Lebow described about China’s greater 
contribution in keeping the global economic stability and US role mostly in provision of 
the security to ensure the global peace and development. China has claimed that AIIB 
will be an institution led by developing countries. Hence, the success of AIIB will con-
firm Acharya’s idea about a multiplex world in the future. However, the new develop-
ment does not preclude the future uncertainties and the questions still remain. Can this 
multiplex world order successfully replace the US-dominated global order? Can this new 
world order be sustainable? In fact, even with the emergence of other countries in man-
aging global affairs, it is still difficult for an existing power to give its influence away to 
other countries. The US has been accelerating the TPP negotiations to counterbalance 
China’s growing influence in spite of TPP’s insignificant economic benefits to America 
(Chiang 2014). At the annual APEC summit in 2014, President Obama told a group of 
business leaders that: “There should be no doubt that the United States of America 
remains entirely committed when it comes to Asia……The United States is not just here 
in Asia to check a box. We believe our shared future is here in Asia.”3
1 “Obama seeks new level in US relationship with China”, Voice of America, 11 November 2014, <http://www.voanews.
com/content/us-china-breakthrough-on-wto-free-trade-deal/2515601.html> (accessed 13 November 2014); “At APEC 
summit, Obama seeks to allay fears about U.S. staying power, pushes trade pact”, The Washington Post, 13 November 
2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-beijing-obama-renews-push-for-trade-pact-he-says-could-be-his-
toric-agreement/2014/11/10/8939a2e2-68a0-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html> (accessed 13 November 2014).
2 “Obama: We’re all for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, The Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2015, http://blogs.
wsj.com/economics/2015/04/28/obama-were-all-for-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/ (accessed 8 October 
2015).
3 “At APEC summit, Obama seeks to allay fears about US staying power, pushes trade pact”, The Washington Post, 20 
November 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-beijing-obama-renews-push-for-trade-pact-he-says-
could-be-historic-agreement/2014/11/10/8939a2e2-68a0-11e4-a31c-77759fcleacc_story.html> (accessed 14 November 
2014).
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This article argues that although the US has gradually lost its multiple functions in 
the global governance, this does not mean a decline of US hegemony. The main reason 
is that there are no better choices, particularly for East Asian countries. Unless China 
could act as a consumption engine and a security provider, the center-periphery con-
nections between the US and Asia can hardly be broken off. Developing countries in 
Asia may have interest to form an institutionalized network so that their voice can be 
heard widely and the risk of over dependence on the US economy can be diversified. 
However, as China’s economy is also highly linked with the US, any China-backed initia-
tives or institutions will not change the nature of global political economy dominated by 
America. As long as China is not able to challenge the US economically and militarily, 
the development of institutionalized network will not be a threat to the US dominance. 
On the contrary, it could be a supportive mechanism to the US in maintaining global 
rules and order.
The term “American hegemony”, “internationally dominant economy (IDE)” and 
“American world order” are used interchangeably based on various literatures’ inter-
pretations regarding the dominant power’s relations with the global political economy. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section provides theoretical back-
ground about the US hegemony. The second reviews the evolution of US hegemony in 
East Asia. The third summarizes the debates regarding the sustainability of US hegem-
ony after China’s rise. In the fourth section, the main contributions made by the two 
books are highlighted. This article argues that although the US power presence may not 
seem as strong as it was before, it will continue to stay for a period of time. Finally, this 
article concludes with a final assessment of the two books and their contribution to fur-
ther understanding the US hegemony in both theoretical debates and empirical studies.
Theoretical interpretations of US hegemony in the global political economy
The importance of a hegemonic power in stabilizing the global economy was initially 
indicated by Kindleberger in the 1970s. He argued that the world economic recession in 
1929 was mainly because of the lack of “last resort”. At the time when the global econ-
omy was in a deep slump, the UK power was on the decline and no longer capable of 
reviving the global economy. Meanwhile, the US was hesitant about taking up the lead-
ership position (Kindleberger 1975).
The end of World War II (WWII) marked the start of a new global order. The UK eco-
nomic power in the world since the nineteenth century was evidently replaced by the US 
in the twentieth century. Instead of simply being the dominant economic power with its 
highly developed capitalist economy, the US has even been able to exercise its political 
ascendancy over all capitalist nations. Nonetheless, the arrival of US as a global power 
did not make the world economy to be developed more stably. According to Perroux, 
because of IDE’s “superiority” in economic performance and industrial production, its 
influence on a dominated country is quite significant and irreversible. The principal 
methods that an IDE exerts on a dominated nation are the modification in the invest-
ment or trade volume, leading to an improvement or deterioration of dominated nation’s 
commercial balance. The development will thus inevitably become a confrontation 
between the two countries because the improvement in the trade balance of a country 
is considered as a deterioration of the trade balance of the other one. In terms of global 
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governance, Perroux indicated the unsuccessful Bretton-Woods system was due to the 
incompatibility between its semi-liberalism and America’s strong dominant characters 
in the world. The Bretton-Woods system that sought to avoid repeating the financial cri-
sis in the 1930s actually resulted in more gaps between the countries (Perroux 1987).
The hegemonic state’s character was further visualized by Keohane’s theory of hegem-
onic stability. According to Keohane, hegemonic powers must have control over raw 
materials, sources of capital, control over market and competitive advantages in the pro-
duction of highly valued goods (Keohane 1984). Unlike the Marxist’s focus on the class 
interest and production relations in a hegemonic system and the liberalist’s emphasis on 
the institutional power of the hegemony, the realist theories highlight the indispensa-
ble role of the hegemony in maintaining the world order. During the Cold War era, the 
US constructed an economic interdependence framework with its major allies in both 
Europe and Asia within which the global economy functioned. The security interest and 
alliance cohesion further provided political glue that held the world economy together 
and facilitated compromise of important national differences over economic issues 
(Gilpin 2001).
However, history proves that the global power is not forever the same one. Waller-
stein‘s Modern World System (MWS) theory pointed out that before the arrival of the 
nation-state political system in early modern Europe, the international system had been 
characterized by successive world empires. The world-empire was a centralized politi-
cal unit that guaranteed economic flow from the periphery to the centre by force and 
by monopolistic advantages in trade (Wallerstein 1974). Similar to MWS, Modelski’s 
long cycle theory also showed the entrances and exits of different world powers since 
about 1500. The global leaders were often chosen by the wars though it may not always 
be the necessary condition for selecting the future leader (Modelski 1987). According 
to Gerbier, the unavoidable decline of the IDE is attributed to both internal and exter-
nal reasons. Via outward investment and exports, the IDE transferred the technology to 
the other countries that benefited their development. Besides, the IDE’s higher resource 
distribution on the military made its capacity to maintain the competitiveness in civil 
economy into question (Gerbier 2007). The international relationships are built on the 
process of fight and competition for “global leader” between the uneven and diverse 
state economies.
With the end of Cold War, the US political leadership and close economic ties with 
its traditional allies waned. Part of the reason was due to former communist countries’ 
transformation towards the market-oriented economies that altered the Cold War global 
capitalist economic system. Following this new wave of development, much of the debate 
has been centred on the sustainability of the US dominance in managing this new global 
political economy. Some predicted the unavoidable decline of the US power presence 
while others argued that there is no better alternative than the current system led by the 
US. The theory of hegemonic stability has also encountered critics from a number of 
scholars on theoretical, historical and political grounds. Some of the critics rose due to 
the rising assertiveness of China. By proposing “offensive realism”, Mearsheimer argued 
that because of international anarchy, each power looks for opportunities to gain influ-
ence at each other’s expense. Their ultimate goal is to become a hegemon. As such, there 
is an intense security competition among great powers. If a potential hegemon emerges 
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and local powers cannot contain it, US troops are likely to come to the region to balance 
against that rising threat (Mearsheimer 2001).
The US Hegemony in East Asia after WWII
Development of US–Asia connection
Under what Berger called “the US-led modernization project”, a group of countries in 
Asia was successfully transformed into the modern capitalist countries after WWII. 
The modernization project centered on the state-guided national development in these 
countries was actually associated with the US security interests against the communist 
regimes between the 1940s and the 1970s (Berger 2004). Because of the collapse of Chi-
ang Kai-Shek’s regime in China, the reconstruction of Japan became urgent. The US 
hoped that its aid on revitalizing Japanese economy could avoid the potential Commu-
nist expansion to Japan and allow Japan to replace China as the economic hub of East-
Asia (Rotter 1987). The military procurement for Korean War and Vietnam War further 
promoted the rise of Japan as a regional economic power. Other countries in East Asia, 
such as Taiwan and South Korea, also benefited from American aid and US military 
expenditure during the Vietnam War to offset their chronic trade deficits.
Whilst the US would deliver financial assistance and open up its markets, Japan would 
export technology and carry out foreign direct investment projects to Taiwan and South 
Korea (Halevi 1998). With a designed industrialization patterns in the region, the spe-
cific trade type between the US, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and other Asian countries 
developed: Japan, and other Asian nations gained their trade surplus via exporting the 
goods to the US but most of the Asian countries had a trade deficit with Japan because 
of the large imports of Japanese high technology and capital goods. In short, without the 
US tolerance of imported goods from the Asian countries, it is hard to imagine how the 
“Asian economic miracle” could have been achieved.
This point of view that centered on the US hegemonic position in the Asian economic 
development and integration also leads to an adaptation of the “flying geese” model. Dif-
ferent from the traditional “flying geese” model that saw Japan as the initial goose, Ozawa 
suggested the Asian economic miracle was actually led by the US as the first goose, fol-
lowed by Japan, the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs), the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China. The Pax Americana constitutes an economic 
system which Ozawa called “hegemon-led macro-clustering”, an extended outcome of 
“Pax Britannica-led macro-clustering”. Ozawa explained that “Macro-clustering” is a 
phenomenon in which hegemony generates growth stimuli for its closely aligned group 
of countries. The growth stimuli include the dissemination of technology, knowledge, 
skills access to the hegemony’s home market, and institutional arrangements of open 
market capitalism (Ozawa 2003).
Apart from the economic entanglement, the security relationship between the US and 
Asian nations have also been quite close. However, unlike the engagement of European 
nations in a security organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Asia’s only regional security organization-Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
was so ineffective that it could not resolve the regional conflict via a collective military 
alliance. Instead, a separate military alliance between each Asian nation and the US has 
worked more effectively. Every Asian nation depends on the US respectively and all of 
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them together have formed a security network oriented towards the US as the central 
power. In Ikenberry’s view, these security and economic relationships between the US 
and Asia have grown into a complex system of interdependencies. The Asian coun-
tries export goods to America whilst America offers the military protection for these 
countries. The exported goods makes the Asian countries accumulate substantial trade 
surplus while these surplus are used to finance the American deficit (Ikenberry 2004). 
America acquires the strategic partners to consolidate its dominance in the region while 
the Asian countries get protection and economic growth. In nutshell, the American pol-
icy towards Asia has been a tangled mixture between security and economic considera-
tions (Cumings 1984).
China’s economic development within the US‑led capitalist system
The US gradual removal of trade barriers against China after China-US reconciliation 
at the end of the 1970s has contributed to China’s smooth integration into the US-Asia 
economic network (Asia produces and America consumes). With the trade agreement 
between China and the US in 1979, the US agreed to remove some commercial barriers 
against China. From 1980 to 1999, the US restored most favored nation (MFN) status to 
China, offering low tariffs to Chinese exports to the US. Following the 1989 massacre on 
Tiananmen Square, the legislation sought to tie China’s MFN renewal to meeting certain 
human rights conditions. Eventually, the Americans did not succeed in producing new 
legislative measures to restrict China’s MFN status and the MFN status was still offered 
to China annually (Pregelj 2001). In 2000, the Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
(PNTR) status was granted to China before its admission to the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) in 2001. Incorporating China into the world economy was considered as 
the best strategy to deal with this giant country on the rise. In President Clinton’s words: 
“Trade is a force for change in China, exposing China to our ideas and integrating China 
into the global economy” (CNN News 1998).
The grant of tariff reduction to China’s exports has apparently enhanced China–US 
trade relationship, squeezing out other East Asian countries’ importance in the US’ 
external trade. Since 2002, China has replaced Japan to become the most significant 
exporter to the US market in East Asia. Since 2005, the US has become the top export 
destination for China (Morrison 2005). China’s mounting exports also outstrip other 
Asian countries to become the US’ largest source of trade deficit. US trade deficit with 
China has begun to surpass its trade deficit with New Newly Industrializing Economies 
(NNIEs, including Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) since 1988, with 
NIEs since 1991 and with Japan since 2000. US trade deficit with China continued to 
increase, amounting to US$319 billion in 2013, about three times greater than the US 
total trade deficit with Japan and NNIEs (US Census Bureau).
In spite of the closer China–US trade relations, China’s involvement in the regional 
division of labour did not change the economic interdependence between the US and 
East Asian countries. It only enlarged America’s trade imbalance based on the US–Asia 
economic interdependence that exited since several decades ago. Therefore, the US trade 
deficit problem is not simply a US–China bilateral commercial imbalance, but rather, it 
is a commercial imbalance between the US and the whole Asia-Pacific region.
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Like other East Asian countries, China also used its substantial trade surplus to pur-
chase US securities. China’s holding of US treasury securities had increased from 
US$60.3 billion in December 2000 to US$1263 billion in April 2014, accounting for 21 % 
of total treasury securities held by foreign countries (US Department of the Treasury). 
Although China’s purchase of US treasury securities helped to fund US budget deficit, 
there are concerns that China may use it as leverage over US policies. Some pointed 
out that China’s sudden reduction of US securities is less likely as it would concurrently 
decrease the value of China’s remaining dollar-denominated assets. Such a move would 
also result in a sharp drop of US imports from China and harm China’s manufacturing 
production and employment (Morrison and Labonte 2013).
Debates on the sustainability of the US dominance after China’s rise
Even though the likelihood of China’s attempt to destabilize the US dollar is question-
able, China is unlike America’s traditional cold war allies who, on the whole, toe the 
line of the US politically. Instead, there have always been disagreements on political 
issues between the US and China. With China’s economic rise and growing assertive-
ness, many scholars doubt whether the regional or global order led by the US would be 
sustainable. For Beeson, the US strategy to incorporate China into the US-dominated 
regional economy has backfired after China has grown in economic strength and influ-
ence in regional affairs, implying that the US has indirectly created a potential com-
petitor that may challenge its dominance (Beeson 2006). Still many predict that at least 
in the coming decades, the US hegemonic power will still be unchallengeable in East 
Asia. On one hand, China does not want to challenge the US military presence in the 
region, except for in the Taiwan Strait, as it believes that the US would help the PRC 
to keep an eye on any prospective Japanese or Russian adventurism (Khoo and Smith 
2002). On the other hand, China’s economic growth and greater economic liberalization 
have greatly increased links with the US, such as the high ratio of American investment 
in China and the increasing Chinese exports towards the US market. For over 20 years, 
China has abandoned the Maoist economic strategy of self-reliance and has chosen to be 
dependent on the leading capitalist country. Without the dependence on the US for its 
economic growth, the Communist Party of China cannot assure its enduring legitimacy 
claims. Therefore, it is argued that China would be reluctant to seek to balance Ameri-
can power in the region (Van Ness 2001).
Nonetheless, the closer economic relations did not lead to more political trust. China 
is aware of the impact of its emergence on the US. Former Chinese President Hu Jin-
tao in his speech to the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in May 
2012 proposed a new type of major power relationship (Glaser 2012). During his visit 
to the US in June 2013, China’s current leader Xi Jinping further defined the concept of 
“new model of major country relationship” as no conflict and no confrontation; mutual 
respect; and win–win cooperation (Lawrence 2013). Nonetheless, the US did not seem 
to fully embrace China’s proposal of a “new model”. For the US, to meet China’s demand 
for “mutual respect” would be a challenge. China has made it clear that “sovereignty” 
refers to not only People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) sovereignty over mainland China 
but also Taiwan and disputed maritime territories in the South and East China Seas. The 
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US could hardly stand “neutral” if its allies’ national security was under threat of China’s 
aggression.
For Reich and Lebow, the weakening US influence explained their incapability to 
manage the globalization and to control China’s emergence. On the other hand, Reich 
and Lebow also considered that China does not intend to use their growing power to 
reconstitute the global economic system. Instead, Chinese leaders appear intent on pre-
serving the global economic system from which they benefits a lot. According to Reich 
and Lebow, China has increasingly focused on custodial function, designed to sustain 
the US-led capitalist system, such as support for the dollar and euro, financial aid and 
investment in Global South, capital infusion to support American banks and incremen-
tal convertibility of the renminbi (RMB). In (Ikenberry 2008) view, the end of US unipo-
lar power does not necessarily mean a war or the overthrow of the rule-based Western 
system. If the US can strengthen the institutionalized world economy, it is more likely 
that China will continue with this capitalist economic order. In this regards, with the 
assistance from China, the US dominant role in the world system continues and may 
continue to stay in place in the foreseeable future. This is still the US hegemony but 
appeared in another form. This world based on the US-led order could be more stable 
with an emerging power to support it rather than to be in confrontation with it. In coun-
terpart, the US has no intention to discipline China’s greater power expansion in the 
region. The continuing crisis in the Middle East might distract American attention out 
of Asia again. The US cannot abandon cooperation with China to attain US foreign pol-
icy objective in the region (Copper 2014).
For Acharya, in spite of the weakening AWO, a Chinese regional hegemony in Asia is 
unlikely to materialize. China has serious deficiencies as a global power in terms of its 
power projection capabilities, its ability to provide public goods or the attractions of its 
ideology and values. And its myriad conflicts with neighbors would hold it down from 
achieving both regional and global hegemony. Chinese leaders proposed ideas and insti-
tutions for domestic and international governance drawn from China’s own history and 
culture and seek to image the future world order in terms of their own past. However, 
the effect of exporting its values is not obvious. The less likelihood of China’s values to 
be accepted by other countries can be attributed to its insufficient “soft power”. Accord-
ing to the latest released country index of soft power in 2015, China is ranked the last 
one among the 30 countries investigated. Other large developing countries such as Bra-
zil, Mexico, and Turkey are ranked ahead of China while the UK, Germany and the US 
are the top three (Soft power index 2015). Without having both hard and soft power at 
its hands, China can hardly realize “smart power strategies” to overcome difficulties for 
becoming a global leader (Nye 2009).
There are also a number of discussions on the decline of US hegemony resulting from 
the US current account deficit and foreign debt. Nonetheless, it is argued that the US 
power based on its economic superiority and financial stability will not end soon. In East 
Asia, even though the US capacity to import from the region is diminishing, it is still 
the largest market for the manufactured goods and one of the largest import sources for 
most of Asian countries. As mentioned by Levey and Brown, the American hegemonic 
position would not be seriously threatened unless the US erects a protectionist policy 
and isolates itself from global trade (Levey and Brown 2005). With reference to the trade 
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deficit problem, the Asian governments, who pursued export-led growth with underval-
ued exchanged rates, are still willing to finance the US imports of their final goods. An 
important reason why the economic system based on the US’ accumulation of debt is 
supported by the majority of Asian countries is that there is no better alternative. Many 
Asian countries regard amassing foreign exchange reserves via exports as a self-insur-
ance against sudden negative financial shocks. As a result, the US’ long term securities 
held by foreign governments had surged from US$4466 billion in September 2011 to 
US$5961 billion in April 2014. Of this, around 52 % was held by East Asian countries 
(US Department of the Treasury). Unless the US is unwilling to repay Asia, the system 
could run into trouble (Dooley et al. 2003).
The world after the US hegemony
The world order in transformation
In parallel to Perroux’s thought about global economic instability brought by IDE, Reich 
and Lebow specified that American effort to maintain order were a primary source of 
disorder in the international system. However, different from Perroux, Reich and Lebow 
reject conventional view that emphasizes America’s structural position in the global 
economy or its capacity to leverage its market access by using crude instruments of 
power.
Reich and Lebow’s main points of view regarding the US hegemonic role are listed 
below:
1. Deterioration of the US power since the post-war period: Different from conven-
tional belief that the US hegemony has continuously existed since the end of WWII, 
Reich and Lebow considered the American hegemony has quickly eroded during the 
post-war period following other countries’ growing economic strength and political 
stability.
2. Focus on the US “influence” rather than “power”: Reich and Lebow argued that 
“America is unequivocally powerful but only occasionally influential”. Over the past 
decades, the US translation of its power into influence has proved a failure as shown 
in the ineffective results of US aid to Egypt and Israel as well as in the case of mili-
tary invasion in Iraq. The ineffectiveness of US intervention in other countries’ affairs 
showed that a hegemon did not always contribute to international stability.
3. Rejection of hegemon’s multi-functional capacity: Reich and Lebow disagreed with 
the typical realists and liberals’ description about hegemon’s multiple functions in 
providing leadership, economic management and security goods. Instead, they 
believe that the world is shifting towards a division of functions. Other actors will 
emerge in taking more responsibilities and exert more influence. New transnational 
forces, coupled with US loss of legitimacy and abandonment of its traditional eco-
nomic management responsibilities have accelerated the fragmentation of those 
functions that usually associated with hegemony.
However, the above statements are arguable. First, other countries’ development of 
economic strength during the post war decade, especially Asian countries, has been 
based on the US market opening up. Although the US progressively ceased the financial 
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aid to these capitalist countries during the cold war era, the aid actually continued but 
was transformed into another form. That means the US investment in developing coun-
tries as well as consumption of goods from these countries. The so-called state-led eco-
nomic development in Asia would not have a success if there was no US tolerance of 
huge imports from these developing countries. In term of political stability in certain 
countries, it has been based on the military alliance or defense treaty between the US 
and individual countries to deter potential aggression from another country. For exam-
ple, the US supplied Taiwan military equipment to prevent from China’s invasion. The 
US aided South Korea in defense the country from being attacked by the North.
Second, the US unsuccessful intervention in Middle East affairs cannot be a strong evi-
dence of US waning influence in the world. Middle East is a complicated region that no 
country is able to mediate their long term conflict. The US did not succeed in stabilizing 
the region but we cannot extend this unsuccessful case to assert that the US did not con-
tribute to the international stability. The US power presence did contribute to the stabil-
ity in Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea over the last few decades.
Third, other actors’ participation in sharing the responsibilities in global governance 
can be regarded as a burden-sharing but not the loss of the US legitimacy as a global 
hegemony. On one hand, the purpose of these countries’ involvement in managing global 
affairs is to support the current capitalist system instead of overturning it. On the other 
hand, the US would still try to counterbalance the development of regional or global pol-
icy economy if that development is considered to deteriorate the US geopolitical inter-
ests. For example, the US did not pay attention to the development of institutionalized 
economic integration in Asia-Pacific. It is the quick growth of bilateral and multilateral 
Free trade agreements (FTA) in recent years that motivated the US to actively engage in 
TPP negotiation.
Multiple actors in the future world order
AWO developed by Acharya has a close similarity with hegemonic stability theory but it 
downplays the coercions aspect. According to Acharya, the contribution of other actors 
to global peace and order is also important but often underestimated. Unlike liberals or 
realists who believe the end of US hegemony would mean a world with danger, disorder 
and disintegration, Acharya think that an increase in the number of greater powers does 
not necessary resulted in chaos and disorder in international system.
In addition, despite the claims about the US power, its legitimacy and public good 
functions, Acharya considered that only a small part of the world was influenced by 
AWO. The soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia and other “third world” countries were 
outside it. Therefore, the AWO can be viewed as an international order but not the 
world order during the post-WWII period. It is until the 1990s when the Soviet Union 
was collapsed and Eastern European countries and China, India and Vietnam reoriented 
their economic development, the scope of the liberal order expanded.
Acharya further develops two possible future scenarios after the decline of AWO:
1. Global concert model: This model is a collective hegemony of a group of great pow-
ers. While relations among the great powers continue to be competitive, they share a 
common interest in preserving international stability. As such, rules and institutions 
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will be developed not only to reduce competition among them but also to manage 
other conflicts affecting the international system as a whole. In this model, the US 
would have to give up some privileges in return for trust and cooperation from other 
powers in order to make this new system work. In the meantime, although emerging 
powers may possess growing material power, they have their own legitimacy deficits 
and authority limitations. Hence, they are not in a position to take over leadership 
positions in global governance.
2. Regional worlds: In regional worlds, regions not only self-organize their economic, 
political, cultural interactions and identities but also provide an important founda-
tion of world order. The creation and maintenance of regional institutions are not 
dominated by a single power. Instead, the sources and agency and approaches regard-
ing order are diffuse and shared among actors. For the US, the formation of regional 
worlds might facilitate more burden-sharing. For other countries, regional worlds 
could be more reflective of the interests and identities of the local actors, instead of 
serving America’s interest alone. The greater push for regionalism might make the 
reform in global institutions (such as the United Nations) more likely. In regional 
world, power matters, but local responses to power may matter even more in the 
construction of regional order.
Although the two models for the future order are quite possible, they do not jump out 
of the “centre-periphery” relations. As mentioned by Acharya that emerging countries 
and not able to take over the leadership role in the global concert model, the US leading 
position will remain. The US could probably adopt some soft or smart strategies vis-à-vis 
the emerging powers to ensure that the US is still the rule-maker in this global system. It 
is true that the US could abandon some of its privileges in exchange of trust or coopera-
tion from other countries. But this “comprising strategy” with other countries has been 
existed in US foreign policy over the last few decades. Despite the abandonment of some 
of its privileges, it did not harm the US leadership position in the world.
The development of “regional world” is even more probable. Nonetheless, as Acharya 
also articulated that the regional institutions will not be dominated by a single power, 
they are more like a burden-sharing mechanism for the US. As such, the regional institu-
tions will help to shape the development of world order towards a model acceptable for 
both developing and developed countries. Therefore, it is going to strengthen the legiti-
macy of the US hegemony, instead of undermine the us power presence.
Conclusion
The two books reviewed are highly entertaining and offer thought-provoking analysis. 
While Reich and Lebow’s analysis is mainly on formulating a more realistic place for the 
US in world affairs, Acharya offers some suggestions on how the US should behave in the 
face of multiplex world. Built upon an insightful combination of theoretical and empiri-
cal approaches, these two books make important contribution to advance the debates on 
the study of international relations and critical thinking on the practice of foreign policy.
One important common feature of the two books is that they do not focus on Chi-
na’s challenge to the US dominance alone. Instead, they regard the world as a whole and 
China is one of the essential elements in constructing the future world order. In other 
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words, the two books do not emphasize on the “zero-sum” game of Sino–US power rela-
tions. Indeed, like other Asian countries, China’s development also depends on export-
ing goods to America. This was an American strategy to incorporate the Communist 
China into the global economy while expecting that economic integration would be 
helpful to restrain Moscow’s power. Chinese officials also claimed that the country does 
not seek global hegemony and will follow the existing world order. Although China’s 
growing economy has enhanced its assertiveness in global affairs, as the two books indi-
cated, China is still far from a leader in Asia as well as in the world.
As such, when looking at the world entirely, we may not need to worry about how 
China can fit with the existing world order that we are accustomed to. China’s current 
rigid one-party political system is very different from the majority of countries in the 
world which are in either two-party or multi-party systems. Therefore, it may be more 
in China’s worry that, following its deeper integration with the global economy, how the 
Chinese socialist values can cope with the capitalist world and how the rise of an author-
itarian regime can be accepted by most of the democratic countries in the world.
If China was not able to challenge the US hegemony, there is no question that that 
the US supremacy would continue to stay. The burden-sharing from other countries in 
global governance do not necessary lead to another round of power transition, whether 
to another single power or to several powers. As most of Asian countries’ economic 
development and national security all depend on the US, the emergence of several 
regional organizations (e.g.: AIIB, FTAAP etc.) will not change the fundamental rela-
tions between America and Asia. More importantly, the US is not willing to give its 
power away to others.
Through TPP, the US is trying to set up new rules for the future world order. The 
development of other institutionalized economic network in East Asia is not going to 
weaken the US dominance but rather, it could enhance the existing capitalist system led 
by the US. In sum, it is still not clear that the division of labour in global governance at 
present will translate into the US power decline. It is true that the world dominated by 
the US is not stable. And this instability brings about appearance of several possibilities 
in terms of future global governance. Nonetheless so far, none of them appeared to be a 
replacement of the current US-led world order.
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